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Aristotle on Predication1
Abstract: Predication is a complex entity in Aristotelian thought. The aim of the present 
essay is to account for this complexity, making explicit the diverse forms it assumes. To this 
end, we turn to a crucial chapter of the Posterior Analytics (1 22), where, in the most com-
plete and developed manner within the corpus, Aristotle proceeds to systematize this topic.
From the analysis, it will become apparent that predication can assume, generically, five 
forms: 1) the predication of essence (τὸ αὐτῷ εἶναι κατηγορεῖσθαι), that is of the genus 
and the specific difference; 2) essential predication (τό ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖσθαι), that 
is either of the genus or of the differences (or their genera); 3) the predication of accidents 
per se and 4) simple accidents (ὡς συμβεβηκότα κατηγορεῖσθαι); 5) accidental predication 
(κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι). 
However, only types 2–4 are forms of strict predication (ἁπλῶς). In effect, the “pre-
dication” of essence is not a genuine predication, but a formula for identity, constituting, 
technically, the statement of the essence of the subject (or its definition). On the other 
hand, accidental “predication” can only be conceived of as such equivocally, since it results 
from a linguistic accident through which the ontological subject of the attribution suffers 
a displacement to the syntactic position of the predicate, which is not, by nature, its own. 
In neither case does the attribution bring about any legitimate predication.
The study concludes with a discussion of Aristotle’s thesis according to which no subs-
tance can be a predicate, which is implied by its notion of accidental predication, a thesis 
which has been – and in our opinion wrongly so – challenged in modern times.
Keywords: Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, predication, predication of essence, essential pre-
dication, predication of accidents, accidental predication.
0. Introduction
Predication is a complex entity in Aristotle’s thought. The object of the present 
paper is to account for that complexity, rendering explicit the several forms it 
assumes.
Given the significance of this concept in Aristotle’s logic and ontology, the task 
is relevant per se. It is, however, particularly important to avoid the confusion that 
can easily set in between two concept pairs whose members Aristotle is careful 
1 An earlier version of this paper was published, under the title “Types of Predication in 
Aristotle (Posterior Analytics I 22)”, in: Journal of Ancient Philosophy, 2012, 6: 1–27.
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to discriminate: one, accidental predication (κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι) 
as different from predication of accidents (ὡς συμβεβηκότα κατηγορεῖσθαι); the 
other, essential predication (τό ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖσθαι) as different from 
predication of the essence (τὸ αὐτῷ εἶναι κατηγορεῖσθαι). And this is so because, 
for Aristotle, neither accidental predication nor predication of the essence is, 
strictly speaking, predication, but rather the “lower” and “upper” margins within 
whose scope predication is defined.
The “upper” limit – predication of the essence – is definition. The distinction 
between definition and approximate forms of predication (viz., essential predica-
tion) is crucial to set up a precise distinction between predication and definition 
and to understand the singularity the notion of definition holds within the set of 
attributive statements in Aristotle.
The “lower” limit corresponds to that which Philoponus dubbed “counterna-
tural predication” (παρὰ φύσιν), so as to distinguish it from predication proper 
or, as he would call it, “natural predication” (κατὰ φύσιν)2 – clearly, a heavily 
symbolic classification.
It is in a crucial chapter of the Posterior Analytics (I 22), a chapter which appa-
rent purpose is merely to show the impossibility of an infinite chain of premises in 
demonstration, that we can find, in a thorough and systematic manner, Aristotle’s 
schematisation of the various types of predication. 
Accordingly, it will be by addressing this chapter, in the form of a running com-
mentary on each of its significant units, that we will attempt to follow Aristotle’s 
lesson on this issue. 
In the end, we will draw some consequences regarding a strong thesis of 
Aristotle’s theory of predication, viz., that no individual can be a predicate.
1. Strict Predication and Accidental Predication
1.1 Text3
In the case of predicates constituting the essential nature of a thing [τῶν ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι 
κατηγορουμένων], the situation is clear: if definition is possible, or, in other words, 
if essential form is knowable,4 and an infinite series cannot be traversed, predicates 
2 Cf. In APo. 236.24–26 Wallies.
3 APo. I 22, 82b37–83a17. (All translations of this chapter are Mure’s, with corrections.)
4 Here, the conjunction ἤ clearly holds epexegetic, not disjunctive, value (thus Mure, 
Tredennick, Tricot; Barnes, Pellegrin).
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constituting a thing’s essential nature [τὰ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενα] must be finite 
in number.
But as regards predicates generally we have the following prefatory remarks to make. We 
can affirm without falsehood that the white (thing) is walking and that that big (thing) 
is a log; or again, that the log is big and that the man walks. But the affirmation differs in 
the two cases. When I affirm that the white is a log, I mean that something which hap-
pens to be white is a log [ὅτι ᾧ συμβέβηκε λευκῷ εἶναι ξύλον ἐστίν], not that white is the 
subject in which log inheres; for it is not because it is white or precisely a certain type of 
white [οὔδ’ ὅπερ λευκόν τι] that the white (thing) comes to be a log. Therefore, the white 
(thing) is not a log except by accident [ὥστ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός]. On the 
other hand, when I affirm that the log is white, I do not mean that something else, which 
happens also to be a log [ἐκείνῳ δὲ συμβέβηκε ξύλῳ εἶναι], is white (as I should if I said 
that the musician is white, which would mean that the man who happens also to be a 
musician [ᾧ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι μουσικῷ] is white); on the contrary, log is here the subject, 
which actually came to be white and did so because it is a log or precisely a certain log, 
not because it is something else. If, then, we must lay down a rule, let us entitle the latter 
kind of statement predication [κατηγορεῖν], and the former not predication at all, or not 
strict [ἁπλῶς] but accidental predication [κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς].
1.2 Comment
In these two paragraphs, Aristotle drafts a preliminary enumeration of several ty-
pes of predication: essential predication;5 predication proper, or strict predication;6 
and accidental predication.7 
Strict predication (ἁπλῶς) and accidental predication (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) are 
clearly distinguished at the end of the passage as opposite types of predication.
The text is, at this point, particularly interesting.
The distinction between accidental and strict predication is there made to de-
pend on a metaphysical interpretation of the subject/predicate pair, namely, that 
not every term that can fill the predicate’s logical or syntactic slot in a sentence 
refers to a predicate in the ontological sense, and particularly the actual predicate 
of the thing referred to by the sentence’s subject, that is, a property that actually 
belongs to it. A more basic distinction is here being assumed between that which 
is a predicate by nature, i.e., that which is said of something (of a “natural” subject), 
and that which is a subject by nature, i.e., that of which something (a “natural” 
predicate) is said.
5 82b37–83a1.
6 83a9–14.
7 83a4–9.
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Aristotle’s thesis that no individual (or, in the terms of the Categories, no pri-
mary substance) can be a predicate is here justified. What it states is that every 
individual is “naturally” a subject, for which reason it cannot be (from an onto-
logical point a view) a predicate. When an individual comes to be a predicate 
(from a logical or syntactic point of view), which is to say, in more rigorous 
terms, when it happens that the name of an individual, or, in general, a singular 
term, fills the predicative slot in an attributive sentence, this happens in a merely 
accidental way, i.e., by virtue of a linguistic accident that abusively shifts it to that 
inappropriate slot.8 
Now, this is the assumption that justifies the distinction between strict predica-
tion (where subject and predicate are “natural”) and accidental predication, where 
subject (e.g., musician in “The musician is white”) or both subject and predicate 
(e.g., “That white thing is a log”) are not “natural”.9
We can thus say that, concerning the distinction between these two types of 
predication, the late Neoplatonic nomenclature that dubbed them “natural” and 
“counternatural”, respectively, albeit not introduced by the Stagirite, quite aptly 
reflects the spirit of his doctrine in this regard. 
It is worth pointing out that the relation of either one or both types of predica-
tion to the essential predication mentioned in the first paragraph is nowhere cla-
rified. Furthermore, it is not explicit whether such predication should be included 
under strict predication or, on the contrary, whether it should be understood as 
some autonomous type to which the two other types of predication distinguished 
in the second paragraph would jointly oppose. 
In this circumstance, the table resulting from the two initial paragraphs can 
be, quite simply, as follows: 
8 See, typically, APr. I 27, 43a32–36: “It is clear then that certain things are not naturally 
said of anything [ἔνια τῶν ὄντων κατ’ οὐδενὸς πέφυκε λέγεσθαι]: in fact, each sensible 
thing has such a nature that it cannot be predicated of anything, save by accident [πλὴν 
ὡς κατὰ συμβεβηκός], as when we say that that white thing is Socrates [τὸ λευκὸν 
ἐκεῖνο Σωκράτην εἶναι] or that that thing that approaches us is Callias [καὶ τὸ προσιὸν 
Καλλίαν].”
9 Along the same lines, cf. Metaph. Δ 7, 1017a7–22, and also: Int. 11, 21a7–16; APr. I 27, 
43a32–43; APo. I 4, 73b5–10; APo. I 19, 81b23–29. Other occurrences in: APo. I 13, 
79a6; Ph. I 4, 188a8; Metaph. Α 6, 987b23; Β 4, 1001a6; Β 4, 1001a10; Β 4, 1001a 28; 
Ν 1, 1087a33; Ν 1, 1087a 35; Ν 1, 1088a28.
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1st PREDICATION TABLE 
Essential (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι)
Predication Strict (ἁpiλῶς)
Accidental (κατὰ συμβεβηκός)
{
However, given that all examples added in the second paragraph are examples 
of non-essential predication, one could assume that the distinction Aristotle in-
troduced therein between strict predication and accidental predication is not to 
be added to the type mentioned in the first paragraph, but to oppose to it, which 
would entail reformulating the table thus:
2nd PREDICATION TABLE
Essential (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι)
Predication Strict (ἁpiλῶς)
Non-essential
Accidental (κατὰ συμβεβηκός){{
This is probably why the differentiation between strict and accidental predications 
opens the subsequent text, which is aimed at excluding the latter, but not the 
former, from the discussion. 
2. Strict Predication
2.1 Text10
White and log will thus serve as types respectively of predicate and subject. We shall 
assume, then, that the predicate is invariably predicated strictly [ἁπλῶς] and not acciden-
tally [ἀλλὰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός] of the subject, for on such predication demonstrations 
depend for their force. It follows from this that when a single attribute is predicated of a 
single subject, the predicate must affirm of the subject either some element constituting its 
essential nature [ἢ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν], or that it is in some way qualified, quantified, related, 
active, passive, placed, or dated.
10 APo. I 22, 83a17–23.
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2.2 Comment
The content of the present paragraph can be captured in the following theses:
1) In every predicative sentence, a predicate stands in the same relation to the 
subject as ‘B’ stands to ‘A’ in the standard sentence ‘A is B’.
2) The predicate can be predicated of the subject either strictly or accidentally.
3) In canonical, or strict, predicative sentences, the predicate stands in the same 
relation to the subject as “white” stands to “log” in the sentence “The log is 
white”. (Up to this point, we have merely summed up the doctrine accounted 
for in the previous paragraph.)
4) Now, every strict predication abides by the table of categories; therefore, in 
such predication, the predicate says of the subject either what the subject is, 
or of which type it is, or in relation to what it is, etc.
5) In the first of the mentioned cases in (4), the predication is essential predica-
tion (ἢ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν).
6) In all remaining cases, it will certainly be strict, but not essential, predication. 
The consequences of this clarification for our subject matter, particularly for sol-
ving the problem left suspended in section 1, are evident.
Following this clarification, strict predication is the predication type that can 
be essential or non-essential, in which case the former is rehabilitated (and given 
the same status as the latter) as a type of strict predication. 
We may now use the data from the current paragraph to put forward a third 
predication table: 
3rd PREDICATION TABLE 
Predication
 Essential (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν)
Strict (ἁpiλῶς)
 Non-essential (piοιόν, piοσόν...)
Accidental (κατὰ συμβεβηκός){ {
There is a staggering difference between the second and third tables:
2nd PREDICATION TABLE 3rd PREDICATION TABLE
Predication
Essential 
Non-essential
Strict
Accidental
Predication
Strict
Accidental
Essential 
Non-essential{ {{ {
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In the left-hand side table, essential predication is opposed to both strict pre-
dication and accidental predication, which are there presented as two types of 
non-essential predication.
In the right-hand side table, essential predication is placed under strict predi-
cation, and it is the latter that, in both its variants (essential predication and non-
essential predication), is now opposed to non-strict, or accidental, predication. 
Clearly, the point of contrast concerns which locus to attribute to essential 
predication. 
Before such a huge discrepancy between the two classifications, to which 
should we ascribe greater value? Should essential predication be considered a 
sub-type of strict predication (third table) or, on the contrary, it is to stand as a 
predication type, side-by-side with non-essential (strict and accidental) predica-
tion (second table)?
This can only be decided in light of the information provided in the subsequent 
paragraphs.
3. Strict Predication (a) of the Substance and (b) of Accidents
3.1 Text11 
Predicates which signify substance signify precisely the subject, or a certain type of the 
subject. Predicates not signifying substance which are predicated of a subject which is 
neither precisely what the subject is, nor a certain type of what the subject is, are accidents 
[συμβεβηκότα]. For instance, when you predicate white of man, man is not precisely white 
or precisely a certain type of white [οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὔτε ὅπερ λευκὸν οὔτε ὅπερ 
λευκόν τι], but rather animal, since man is precisely an animal [ὅπερ γὰρ ζῷόν ἐστιν ὁ 
ἄνθρωπος]. These predicates which do not signify substance must be predicates of some 
other subject, and nothing can be white which is not white because of something else.
3.2 Comment
In this paragraph, Aristotle sets forth a double alternative to what we have so far 
been indistinctly calling “essential predication”.
On the one hand, some essential predicates (or “things which signify subs-
tance”) are those that “signify precisely the subject”. In this case, essential pre-
dicates express the nature or identity of the subject itself, and therefore, in the 
predicative sentence, the predicate is identical to the subject.12
11 APo. I 22, 83a24–32.
12 The terms “identical”, “identification”, “identity”, which we will henceforth systemati-
cally use, always possesses intensional value, expressing the interchangeability of the 
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On the other hand, essential predicates can also be those that signify “a certain 
type of what the subject is”. In this instance, essential predicates do not express 
the subject itself, but that under which the subject falls in the generative scale, 
namely, a genus or a differentia of the subject.13
Considering the alternative here proposed, we may now understand that es-
sential predication in a certain sense is and in a certain sense is not strict predica-
tion, which allows us to understand the reason for the discrepancy between the 
second and third tables, as well as to solve it, bringing it to a more enlightening 
compatibility.
In a certain sense it is, and in another sense it is not, strict predication, because 
it itself already has two meanings, namely, those two we have just introduced.
Let us be quite clear, though, as to what this means. It is not that, in Aristotle, 
the present sentence on the one hand excludes, while on the other hand includes, 
essential predication from strict predication. In fact, from Aristotle’s point of view, 
the characterisation of essential predication here introduced is stated against non-
essential predication and within the general framework of strict predication. This 
much is shown in the fact that Aristotle proceeds to this characterisation after 
having restricted the discussion to strict predication,14 and by his introducing in 
the next lines, as a contrast, predication of accidents15 as a second type of strict 
predication. Accordingly, essential predication is here presented as a sub-type of 
that which is called, simply, “to predicate” (κατηγορεῖν ἁπλῶς). And this is clearly 
coherent with the fact that predication ἁπλῶς abides by the table of categories, 
wherein the substance (under which essential predicates fall) is merely a category 
amongst others.
For Aristotle, the question is therefore simple: either there is real predication, 
in which case it abides by the table of categories, where essential predicates are 
included; or there is no predication at all, unless in a certain accidental sense. 
When we limit ourselves to predication ἁπλῶς, as Aristotle does in the begin-
ning, essential predication comes to be but a kind of strict predication, or, simply 
put, one kind of predication. 
subject and the predicate and not just their simple co-extensionality. Technically spea-
king, in Aristotle, the latter constitutes predication proper (ἴδιος), whilst the former is 
the definition (cf. Topics I 4–5, 8).
13 Cf. 83b1.
14 83a17–23.
15 83a25–35.
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In this light, to technically distinguish predication ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, predication 
ἁπλῶς and predication κατὰ συμβεβηκός, as we did in our first table, is to distance 
ourselves from the Aristotelian classification. 
This is so because, for Aristotle, either there is or there is not predication. If 
there is, then predication can as well be essential (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι). If there is not, it 
can nevertheless occur accidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός).
In Aristotle’s view, the crucial divide stands thus between (strict) predication 
and accidental predication. In face of this divide, essential predication has virtually 
no specificity at all (except, of course, to the extent that it is one of the types in 
which predication is subdivided).
All this appears to definitively establish the third predication table as the cor-
rect one from an Aristotelian perspective. However, this is not so. And it is not so 
precisely because of the passage we are currently commenting. Despite what Aristotle 
could have (or would have liked to have) expressly acknowledged, this passage sets 
the grounds for a new account of strict predication, one which opposes not just 
accidental predication, but also essential predication, or, at least, a certain type of 
essential predication. It is, therefore, essential predication itself which is, in this 
clause, implicitly reassessed. This reassessment enables us to understand why 
essential predication in a sense is, and in another sense is not, strict predication 
and, above all, it enables us to understand in what sense essential predication is, 
and in what sense it is not, strict predication. 
From a general point of view, essential predication is, as already seen, strict 
predication, for predication ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι predicates under the category of subs-
tance. However, the adjective “strict” means here only that essential predication 
is simply (ἁπλῶς) a type of predication and not a kind of pseudo-predication – a 
predication “by accident”. 
That said, if we pay close attention to the nature of essential predication, as it 
is here defined by Aristotle, we realise that there is something fundamental that 
sets it apart from every other type of predication ἁπλῶς. In this sense, the term 
ἁπλῶς acquires a new meaning, circumscribing everything that is predication 
proper, as opposed to accidental “predications” which, due to some motive, are 
not genuine predications, but also as opposed to essential “predications” which, 
due to another motive, are not, likewise, genuine predications. 
Accidental “predications” are not genuine predications because the sentence’s 
predicate does not refer to an actual property of the thing referred to by the 
sentence’s subject, i.e., something that truly belongs to it. In Aristotle’s terms, in 
sentences expressing such “predications”, the predicate is not attributed to the 
subject in virtue of the subject being precisely what it is, but because something 
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else (sometimes, the predicate itself) is, accidentally, that subject. Thus, in “The 
musician is white”, it is not because the musician is a musician, but because there 
is a certain man who happens to be a musician, that the predicate is (accidentally) 
attributed to the subject. Likewise, in “that white thing is a log”, it is not because 
that white thing is white, but because there is a certain log which happens to be 
white, that the predicate is (accidentally) attributed to the subject. In this sense, 
the reason why accidental “predications” are not genuine predications is that one 
necessary condition of predication is not fulfilled: the predicate is not attributed 
to the subject because the subject is what it is (or, which is the same, the predicate 
is not attributed to the subject as something that really belongs to it). In accidental 
predications, what we see is that, by virtue of a syntactic accident, something that 
is not a “natural” predicate, or a “natural” subject, shifts, in the sentence, into a 
logical place that does not “naturally” belong to it.
Now, in the case of essential “predications”, this requirement is fulfilled. But, 
in a way, it is excessively fulfilled, for, in this case, the predicate is not simply at-
tributed to the subject because the subject is precisely what it is, but because the 
subject is precisely that predicate.
Accordingly, whereas in accidental “predications” the predicative link does not 
truly exist, for the sentence’s predicates do not refer to actual properties of the 
subject, in essential “predications”, the predicative link is not truly predicative, for 
the sentence’s predicates do not refer to properties of the subject in the strict sense 
of the word (ἁπλῶς) – they refer to the subject itself.
In a word, essential “predications” are not, for Aristotle, genuine predications, 
but identity formulae. They must thus be distinguished from strict predication, 
just as it happened with accidental “predications”, albeit for a different reason. 
Granted that nowhere in this chapter does Aristotle expressly draw this con-
clusion. However, in an overall context, this conclusion is required by the char-
acterisation of predication qua attribution “of something to something” (τὶ κατὰ 
τινός),16 or “of another to another” (ἕτερον καθ’ ἑτέρου), 17 or still “of one to one” 
(ἓν καθ’ ἑνός),18 whereas the attribution of essence is a process “of the same to 
the same” (αὐτὰ αὑτῶν).19 
In sum, essential “predication” cannot be strictly considered as predication, in 
that it is a definition: and a definition does not say something of something, but 
16 Cf. Int. 6, 17a25 (and 3, 16b6–10); APr. I 1 24a16.
17 Cf. Cat. 3, 1b10.
18 See, especially, APo. I 22, 83b17–19.
19 Cf. ibid.
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simply the something;20 it does not say of something that [it] is something, but 
merely what the something is.21
It should be noted that this concords with the distinction, consistently assumed 
by Aristotle, in the context of the classification of the principles of demonstration,22 
between saying “that it is” (ὅτι ἔστι) and saying “what it means” (τί σημαίνει): 
definitions do not say that something is something, they merely say what some-
thing means. Therefore, only axioms and theses (hypotheses and postulates) are 
predications – not so definitions. Definitions are not so because they do not truly 
contain a τὶ κατά τινος λέγεσθαι.
Now, this allows us to understand why is it that essential predication is and is 
not strict predication and the sense in which it is and the sense in which it is not 
strict predication.
In fact, everything we have developed throughout the present point is valid for 
definitions only: and what the doctrine introduced in this passage shows exactly 
is that not every essential predication is a definition. 
Aristotle distinguishes between essential predicates that mean precisely that 
of which they are predicated and those that mean a certain type of that of which 
they are predicated.
Let us recall an excerpt already cited:23
For instance, when you predicate white of man: man is not precisely white or precisely a 
certain type of white, but rather animal, since man is precisely an animal. 
That is: in the predication “the man is white”, subject and predicate are not the 
same, because the man is not the white, nor a certain type of white (a specific kind 
of white). But in the predication “man is an animal”, subject and predicate are the 
same, because man is a (certain type of) animal, i.e., a specific kind of animal. 
In the former predicative sentence, that which is attributed is, therefore, an 
accident of man (white), whereas the latter attributes that of which man is a 
species (animal). 
20 See APo. II 4, 91b1–7 (and cf. 91a15–16; II 6, 92a6–9; II 13, 96a20-b1); Top. I 5, 102a13–
14 (and cf. VII 2, 152b39–153a1); Metaph. Ζ 4, 1030a7–11. 
21 Paradigmatically in APo. II 3, 90b38–91a2: “Furthermore, to prove what it is [τὸ τί ἐστι] 
and that it is [ὅτι ἔστι] is different. Definition shows what it is, while demonstration 
[shows] that this is or is not [said] of that [ἡ δὲ ἀπόδειξις ὅτι ἔστι τόδε κατὰ τοῦδε ἢ 
οὐκ ἔστιν].” But cf. also APo. I 1, 71a11–17; 2, 72a18–24; 10, 76b35–77a4. 
22 Cf. APo. I 1, 71a1–17; 2, 72a14–24; 10, 76a31–36.
23 83a28–30.
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Now, in general, these two examples outline the distinction between predica-
tion of accidents and predication of the substance as types of strict predication.
However, if we were to add to them the example Aristotle does not provide in 
this step, viz., “man is a biped animal”, where subject and predicate are the same 
(for man is precisely what to be a biped animal is) the existence of a further type 
of attributive statement would clearly follow – one that would no longer be strict 
predication, but instead more-than-strict (so to speak), or hyperbolic, predication, 
for in it the predicate is precisely the subject. 
The difference between the two types of essential predication is now clear: in 
general predication under the category of substance, the subject is not identified 
with the predicate (man is not animal); instead, it is identified as “a certain type” 
of the predicate (man is a certain kind of animal). In predication of the essence, 
on the contrary, the subject is identified with the predicate itself (man is a biped 
animal); we have, thus, a definition. In other words, the copulative relation is not, 
in the latter case, from predicate to subject, rather from definiens to definiendum.
That is why the distinction between the two types of sentence is, from a logical 
point of view, quite clear too: only the latter is convertible, the former is not. This is 
precisely what the notion of definition as a predication both proper and essential, 
which expresses an identity both extensional and intensional, comprehending at 
the same time the objects that are in the extension of the concepts and the me-
aning of the concepts themselves, allows to technically legislate.24
Now, only in the latter case do we have a definition, where both genus and 
differentia are attributed to the subject. In the former case, on the contrary, that 
which is attributed to the subject is an essential predicate (either the genus or the 
differentia), but not the whole definiens.
Thus, in the latter case, the sentence expresses an identity, and is not strictly a 
predication, whereas in the former, despite the fact that the attributed predicates 
are ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, they are not the τί ἐστιν itself, and thus the attribution is oper-
ated as a predication stricto sensu (κατηγορεὶν ἁπλῶς).25
24 Cf. APo. II 4, 91a15–16; II 6, 92a6–9; II 13, 96a20-b1; but especially: Top. I 4, 101b19–
23; I 6, 102b27–35; I 8, 103b6–19; VI 1, 139a31–32; VII 5, 154a37-b12; and passim.
25 On the distinction between essential predication and predication of the essence (or 
definition), the clearest passage by Aristotle is perhaps the following: “For if A is predi-
cable as a mere consequent of B and B of C, A will not on that account be the definable 
form of C: A will merely be what it was true to say of C. Even if A is predicated of all B 
inasmuch as B is precisely a certain type of A [οὐδ’ εἰ ἔστι τὸ Α ὅπερ τι καὶ κατὰ τοῦ Β 
κατηγορεῖται παντός], still it will not follow: being an animal is predicated of being a 
man (since it is true that in all instances to be human is to be animal, just as it is also 
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We are now able to establish the sense in which essential predication is and the 
sense in which it is not strict predication: it is strict predication when that which 
is attributed is an essential predicate of the subject, but not the complete essence 
of the subject; it is not strict predication when that which is attributed is the very 
essence of the subject or, in other words, when it is a definition.
One must therefore distinguish between: (a) predication of essence; (b) essen-
tial strict predication (“of the substance”); (c) non-essential strict predication (“of 
accidents”); and (d) accidental predication.
In face of these elements, it is now possible to revise the Aristotelian table of 
predication thus: 
4th PREDICATION TABLE 
Of the essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) and
Predication Strict (ἁpiλῶς) of the substance (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι) of accidents (συμβεβηκότα) 
essential predicate: genus or
accidental predicate: quality, quantity …
Accidental (κατὰ συμβεβηκός)
{
The following observations may be taken as the key of the table, so to speak:
1) Predication of the essence is the statement of the essence of the subject, i.e., 
the definition.26
2) Strict predication is that in which a “natural” predicate is said of a “natural” 
subject.
3) When the predicate is part of the subject’s essence (in other words, when it is a 
predicate under the category of substance), the case is one of strict predication 
of the substance.
4) When the predicate is a simple accidental predicate of subject (alternatively, 
when it is a predicate under a category other than that of substance), the case 
is one of predication of the accident.
5) Accidental predication is that in which predication proceeds in a “counterna-
tural” way either because (a), in a sentence, an accident is attributed to another 
true that every man is an animal), but not as identical with being man [ἀλλ’ οὐχ οὕτως 
ὥστε ἓν εἶναι].” (APo. II 4, 91b1–7; and cf. also II 13, 96a20-b1) 
26 Cf. Top. I 5, 101b38. Cf. APo. II 3, 90b29–33; Top. I 4, 101b17–23; I 8, 103b6–12; V 2, 
130b25–28; V 3, 131b37–132a9; VII 3, 153a6–22; VII 5, 154a23–32; VII 5, 155a18–22; 
Metaph. Δ 8, 1017b21–22; Ζ 4, 1030a2-b13; Ζ 5, 1031a1–14; Ζ 13, 1039a19–20; and 
also APo. I 22, 82b37–83a1; II 3, 90b3–4; Top. I 6, 102b27–35; I 18, 108a38-b6; V 5, 
135a9–12; VI 4, 141a26-b2; VI 4, 141b15–34; Metaph. Β 3, 998b4–8.
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accident (“The musician is white”), or because (b), in a sentence, a substance 
is attributed to an accident (“that white thing is a log”).
As we shall see, the next text will provide us with elements to fine-tune this ter-
minology and to adapt it in accordance with the Aristotelian table of predication.
4. A Preliminary Account 
Before moving forwards, though, let us see how these data and those that follow 
from the previous paragraph enable us to adjust and improve the classification of 
predication types implicitly addressed in this chapter of the Posterior Analytics.
After those paragraphs where he distinguished accidental predication from 
strict predication, restricted the investigation to the latter and brought back that 
which can be predicated under the scope of the table of categories, Aristotle ad-
vances two steps in this paragraph: on the one hand, he integrates predicates under 
the category of substance in predication ἁπλῶς; on the other, he reintroduces the 
notion of accident with a new purpose, viz., not as means to discriminate between 
types of predication, but to designate one of the predicate classes that, together 
with those that fall under the category of substance, will exhaust the entirety of 
what can be strictly predicated.27
Taken together, the two newly integrated elements do not add new types of 
predication to the already established ones. What they do bring is a further cha-
racterisation of the types in which strict predication is subdivided: the predication 
of substance, on the one hand, and the predication of accidents, on the other.
However, the simple fact that Aristotle makes here explicit that predication of 
accidents is a kind of strict predication is, in itself, significant in another regard.
By doing so, the difference between the two senses in which the word 
συμβεβηκός may intervene to qualify predication is conclusively rendered clear: 
in one of those senses, it determines accidental predication, which is accidental 
insofar as it is not predication except by accident (κατὰ συμβεβηκός, per accidens); 
in the other, quite distinct, sense, it delimits predication of accidents, which is 
predication strictu sensu (ἁπλῶς), although that which is given through it as pre-
dicates of the subject are its accidents (ὡς συμβεβηκότα, qua accidens).
In the first case, accidentalness qualifies the very predication: and, via this qua-
lificative, such “predication” stands excluded from the set of strict predication. In 
27 For which reason, as aptly noted by Ross, “the predication of συμβεβηκότα is of course 
to be distinguished from the predication κατὰ συμβεβηκός dealt with in the previous 
paragraph” (Ross 1949: 577).
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the second case, accidentalness qualifies but the predicate: therefore, the genuine 
character of the predication is not affected.
In the first case, accidentalness has a methodological sense and its task is to 
keep seemingly predicative formulae from the strict domain of predication. In 
the second case, it bears ontological value and its task is to discriminate a certain 
type of predicate that has legitimate place in strict predication.
Retrospectively, it is not immaterial that, when distinguishing between acci-
dental predication and strict predication, Aristotle never fails to mention predica-
tion of accidents as an instance of strict predication:28 for that means that, in the 
distinction between (strict) predication and mere accidental predication, a further 
distinction, viz., between predication of accidents and accidental predication, is 
also being established.29 This is, of course, a particularly important point of the 
present text. 
At the same time, though – as we have just seen in considerable detail –, the 
paragraph also suggests another relevant aspect: by virtue of its very structure, 
predication of the substance would be better characterised if we allow it to be 
distinguished further, between predication of the essence (which is not, strictly 
speaking, predication, and should therefore be treated separately, viz., as defini-
tion) and predication of that which “is in the essence”, namely, the genus or the 
differentiae (which is, from a logical standpoint, strict predication – albeit with 
unique features – and can thus be considered as a subtype of predication ἁπλῶς, 
viz., essential predication).
One final observation. Obviously enough, “substance” covers two different 
meanings in this context: one, the category under which the substance is predica-
ted (i.e., predication of genera or of differentiae); the other, the “natural” subject 
which, in one of the accidental predication modalities, is shifted to the predicate’s 
logical slot. In neither of these senses, however, is the substance itself a predicate: 
in the former case, it stands as a category of predicates (the genera and differentiae 
28 “We can affirm without falsehood that the white (thing) is walking and that that big 
(thing) is a log; or again, that the log is big and that the man walks. But the affirmation 
differs in the two cases. When I affirm that the white is a log, I mean that something 
which happens to be white is a log, not that white is the subject in which log inheres 
…” (APo. I 22, 83a1–7)
29 The most paradigmatic case is to be found in APo. I 19, 81b25–29: “Here is what I 
mean by ‘accidental’: when we say, for instance, that that white thing is a man we are 
not saying the same thing as when we say that the man is white, since the man is not 
white because he is something else, while the white thing [is a man] because the white 
is, for man, an accident.” 
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said of subjects); in the latter, it is a substance strictu sensu, therefore necessarily 
a subject that only by accident comes to fill the predicate’s logical slot. 
One should note at this point that Aristotle does not clarify (a) whether “subs-
tance” should be here interpreted as concerning primary substances (in the sense 
of the Categories) only, both primary and secondary substances, or, in general, 
any subject exhibiting the logical behaviour of a substance,30 and (b) whether one 
should take “predicates under the category of substance” to mean those genera and 
differences said of primary substances only, or these plus those said of secondary 
substances, or, in general, genera and differences of any subject exhibiting the 
logical behaviour of a substance.31
These questions could have three different answers, depending on the domi-
nion it concerns. In the context of the discussion motivating these developments 
(viz., the possibility of demonstrations having an infinite number of premises), 
the appropriate response would be the most restrictive, for the purpose would 
be that of guaranteeing that the series of subjects stops at individuals (and the 
series of predicates at categories). In the wider context of Posterior Analytics, the 
convenient answer would be either of intermediate restrictiveness or the broadest 
possible, in that demonstrations typically deal with universals, for which reason 
both predicates and subjects should be universal. Generally speaking, nothing 
militates against choosing the broadest answer; on the contrary, everything points 
towards it being the favoured one.
5. Predication of Accidents (a) Per Se and (b) Not Per Se
5.1 Text32
I assume first that predication implies a single subject and a single attribute [ὑπόκειται δὴ 
ἓν καθ’ ἑνὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι] and secondly that, in the case of non-essential predication, 
the same things are not predicated of the same things [αὐτὰ δὲ αὑτῶν, ὅσα μὴ τί ἐστι, μὴ 
κατηγορεῖσθαι]. We assume this because such predicates are all accidents, though some 
are accidents per se [ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν καθ’ αὑτά] and others of a different type [τὰ δὲ καθ’ 
ἕτερον τρόπον]. Yet we maintain that all of them alike are predicated of some subject and 
that an accident is never a subject, since we do not class anything as accident except when 
what it says is said due to its being something other than itself [οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων 
τίθεμεν εἶναι ὃ οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ὂν λέγεται ὃ λέγεται] …
30 Cf. Metaph. Ζ 1, 1028a36-b2; Ζ 4, 1030a17–27.
31 Cf. Top. I 9, 103b27–39; Metaph. Ζ 1, 1028a36-b2; Ζ 4, 1030a17–27.
32 APo. I 22, 83b17–23.
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5.2 Comment
We introduce now the last remaining element that allows us to complete the 
Aristotelian classification of predication: the distinction between accidents per 
se and “simple” accidents.33
We may reformulate the corresponding table thus:
5th PREDICATION TABLE
Of the essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) 
Predication Strict (ἁpiλῶς) of the substance (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι)of accidents (συμβεβηκότα) 
per se (καθ’ αὑτά)
proper (καθ’ ἕτερον τρόpiον)
Accidental (κατὰ συμβεβηκός)
{ { {!
Some final observations in this regard:
1) Predication strictu sensu is that which is neither accidental predication nor 
predication of the essence.
2) It corresponds to three types: [i] predication of genus or differences; [ii] pre-
dication of accidents per se; [iii] predication of “simple” accidents.
3) “Predication” of the essence is not, in fact, predication, rather an identity 
formula, in the terms previously mentioned.
4) Accidental “predication” is predication only equivocally: in fact, it occurs only 
when, by virtue of a grammatical accident, the term that refers to the ontolo-
gical subject of the attribution slides into the predicate’s syntactic slot, which 
is not naturally its own, so that, in the sentence, there is no actual restitution 
of any genuine predication.
33 Cf. in this regard Metaph. Δ 30, 1025a30–34. Other occurrences, both explicit 
and implicit, of συμβεβηκότα καθ’ αὑτά can be found in: APo. I 7, 75b1 (and cf. I 
10, 76b13; I 28, 87a39); Ph. II 2, 193b27–28, and III 4, 203b33 (and cf. De an. I 1, 
402a7; I 1, 402a15; I 1, 402b18; I 1, 402b21; I 1, 402b23–24; I 1,402b26–403a1; I 5, 
409b14); PA I 3, 643a27–28 (and cf. I 1, 639a18–19; I 1, 639a26; I 1, 641a24–25); 
PA I 5, 645b1–3 (and cf. HA I 6, 491a9–11; MA 1, 698a1–4); Metaph. Β 1, 995b20; 
Β 1, 995b25–26; Β 2, 997a20; B 2, 997a21–22 (and cf. Metaph. Β 2, 997a25–34; Γ 1, 
1003a21–22; Γ 2, 1005a13–14; Ε 1, 1025a10–13; Ε 1, 1026a31–32; Κ 3, 1061b4–6); 
Μ 3, 1078a5–6. 
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6. In Defence of Aristotle: No Individual Can Be a Predicate 
This Aristotelian thesis, which although metaphysical in nature is, as seen throug-
hout the current paper, inseparable from Aristotle’s doctrine on predication, was 
challenged in modern times by several authorities. 
Amongst the classic moments, it is worth highlighting those produced during 
the earlier decades of the 20th century by Frank Plumpton Ramsey,34 John Cook 
Wilson,35 Jan Łukasiewicz36 and Peter Strawson.37
On this particular issue, the work of Cook Wilson is somewhat collateral, since 
it attempts to present a general doctrine on the nature of the subject and only 
marginally crosses paths with Aristotle’s.38
Strawson’s essays, in turn, are, to a considerable extent, a recovery of the ana-
lysis developed by Ramsey, with whom he would come to part ways later,39 for 
which reason it is preferable to resort to the original directly.40
We are thus left with Ramsey and Łukasiewicz, to whom we now turn our 
attention.
The object of Ramsey’s essay is to show that “the whole theory of particulars 
and universals is due to mistaking for a fundamental characteristic of reality what 
is merely a characteristic of language”.41
To that effect, he attempts to show that “there is no essential distinction bet-
ween the subject of a proposition and its predicate”, hence “no fundamental clas-
sification of objects can be based upon such a distinction”.42
Ramsey’s argument can be schematically presented thus:
34 Ramsey (1925, reedited, with an appendix from 1926, in Braithwaite 1931, from which 
our quotations are taken).
35 Cook Wilson (1926).
36 Łukasiewicz (1957, we translate from the French edition).
37 Successively in Strawson (1953–1954, 1957a, and 1957b).
38 In the terms of that doctrine, a subject is that of which a sentence asserts so-
mething, which, depending on the context, may or may not coincide with the 
grammatical subject and, in general, with the nominal component that integrates 
the sentence. 
39 Cf. Strawson (1959: 177–179 and 237).
40 For pertinent criticism on Strawson’s primitive position, see Sellars (1957) and Baylis 
(1957).
41 Braithwaite (1931: 117).
42 Braithwaite (1931: 116).
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1. “Socrates is wise” and “Wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates” express the 
same proposition.43 
2. However, that which is subject in one is predicate in the other, and vice-versa. 
3. Now, given that any predicative sentence can be analogously converted into 
an equivalent sentence where subject and predicate switch places, it follows 
that “there is no essential distinction between the subject of a proposition and 
its predicate”. 
The argument would be persuasive if the second premise were true. As it happens, 
it is not. In fact, the first sentence’s predicate is the second sentence’s subject, but 
the first sentence’s subject is not the predicate of the second. “Socrates” is the sub-
ject of the first sentence; but the predicate of the second sentence is not Socrates, 
it is “a characteristic of Socrates”.44 
Thus, Ramsey only showed something we already knew, at least since Aristotle: 
that everything that can be a predicate in a sentence can be a subject in another. 
He did not show, however, what he intended to show: that if it can be a subject in 
a sentence, then it can be a predicate in another. The Aristotelian irreducibility of 
the individual as ultimate subject remains thus unscathed.
But there is more. The second premise involves a fatal ambiguity. When we say 
“that which is subject in one, is predicate in the other, and vice-versa”, the phrases 
“in one” and “in the other” indicate different things depending on whether they 
refer, in Ramsey’s terms, the sentence or the proposition.45 The point is that, if one 
adopts, as does Ramsey, the distinction between sentence and proposition, one 
assumes that the latter is relatively independent from the former, particularly in 
view of the fact that it is precisely in order to safeguard the inalterability of the pro-
position against formal variations that affect the sentence that the distinction itself 
43 In Strawson, who renovates, although more timidly, Ramsey’s argument, the stan-
dard example is “All Socrates’ virtues were possessed by Plato” (cf. Strawson 1957a: 
446–449).
44 Sellars, too, points out, not only against Strawson, but directly against Ramsey, that 
in “Wisdom is instantiated by Socrates”, the predicate is not “Socrates”, rather “to be 
instantiated by Socrates” (cf. Strawson 1957a: 470). 
45 The distinction between proposition, the assertive content of a sentence, and sentence, 
the proposition’s material support, can be considered an inextricable topic from essen-
tialism in all its forms, already present in Aristotle, as we had occasion to show in a 
previous paper (Mesquita 2004: 259–278), and, as we can see, also assumed by Ramsey. 
Quine made it an irreparably controversial issue; see, especially, Quine (1934; 1958: 
21–25; 1960: §§ 40–43; 1968: 139–144; 1970: 1–14; 1974: 36; 1992: 52–53, 77–79, 102; 
1995: 77–78).
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is put forward. As such, switching the position of the terms within the sentence 
will not necessarily entail an equivalent permutation in the proposition it ex-
presses, if it is the case, as it is here, that the fact or state of affairs asserted by the 
proposition remains essentially unchanged when the switch takes place in the 
sentence. Given that the sentences “Socrates is wise” and “Wisdom is a characte-
ristic of Socrates” express, according to Ramsey, the same proposition, the relation 
either sentence represents (the fact either sentence asserts, as Ramsey would put 
it) is the same: the relation of a predicate (wisdom) to a subject (Socrates) – a re-
lation that holds regardless of how the proposition is grammatically transcribed, 
i.e., whichever term (“Socrates” or “wisdom”) happens to be the grammatical 
subject of the sentence. 
Now, there are two important things here. First, when we move from the sen-
tence to the proposition, we realise that the subject is always the same – Socrates. 
That is, at the propositional level (which is to say, at the level of the relation re-
presented by the sentence), the subject is, necessarily, the ultimate subject, i.e., the 
individual. Second, this is precisely why the propositional subject of a sentence “A 
is B” resists, by nature, being converted into a grammatical predicate; it can but 
integrate, as in the case of Ramsey’s example, the grammatical predicate of the 
converse sentence, which asserts that B is a characteristic of A (or that B pertains 
to A, or that B is said of A, etc.), i.e., which precisely asserts B as the predicate of A.
We can now turn to Łukasiewicz. Commenting on a passage from Prior Ana-
lytics, he says:46
This passage47 contains some inaccuracies that it would be best to correct before going 
any further. It is wrong to say that one thing can be predicated by another; a predicate is 
part of a proposition, and a proposition consists in a series of uttered or written terms, 48 
which possess a certain meaning; therefore, one cannot predicate things: one can predi-
cate the word “Callias” by another word: one cannot predicate Callias himself. The above 
classification does not concern things – it concerns terms. 
The reader who has followed this paper thus far will realise that this excerpt is built 
upon a fundamental misunderstanding concerning two levels that Aristotle keeps 
quite apart: the ontological level, where he speaks of predicates as something that 
pertains to things; and the logical level, where he speaks of predicates as something 
that is said of things (through the terms by which things are referred to). In the 
latter case, the predicate is in fact a term and it is in fact part of a sentence; in the 
46 Łukasiewicz (1957: 26).
47 APr. I 27, 43a25–43.
48 “Proposition”, for Łukasiewicz, has of course the same meaning as “sentence”.
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former, however, the predicate is an entity and, as such, it is utterly extra-logical and 
extra-linguistic. The entire Aristotelian system of categories (the ways according to 
which something is said to be) can only make sense assuming this presupposition.
More than that: the two levels are connected – and they are connected by the 
primacy of the former over the latter. In fact, it is only because something pertains 
to something else qua an ontological predicate that it can be said of that thing as a 
logical predicate. It is only insofar as something is a predicate of something that it 
can become that which is predicated of that thing in a sentence (in the latter case, 
subject and predicate are not, of course, the entities themselves, rather the terms 
that refer to those entities).49
In this sense, Aristotle never states or implies that “one thing can be predica-
ted by another”: what he does say is that “something” (i.e., an entity, in general 
terms) can be a predicate of another. He certainly states and implies, however, that 
“things can be predicated”: for, although the subject of a predicative sentence is 
not the thing itself, it is the thing itself that, through its name, is predicated by the 
predicate of the predicative sentence.50
On our subject, Łukasiewicz adds: 51
Likewise, it is wrong to say that individual or singular terms, e.g., “Callias”, cannot be truly 
predicated of anything. Aristotle himself is the first to line up examples of true proposi-
tions with singular predicates: “This white object is Socrates”; or “That who approaches is 
Callias”. These propositions are true, he says, “by accident”,52 but there are other examples 
49 On the problem of accidental predication, Lear sees, correctly, the juxtaposition of 
two levels – logical and ontological – in all predication. Cf. Lear (1980: 31): “A phrase 
like ‘the white thing is a log’ is a degenerate form of predication, for it fails to reveal 
the metaphysical structure of subject and predicate. It is not that the white thing is 
the underlying subject which happens to be a log. Rather the log is the underlying 
subject which happens to be white (An. Pst. 83a1–14). Only predications which reveal 
metaphysical structure are strict and it is with these that proof is concerned.” And a 
few lines ahead: “Aristotle distinguishes predicating from saying truly (An. Pst. 83a38). 
Predication is not merely a linguistic act. Though one can say both ‘the white thing is 
a log’ and ‘the log is white’, only the latter is a genuine predication.”
50 In fact, even from the point of view of modern elementary logic, what does it mean to 
say that an object satisfies a predicate, other than that object has the property signified 
by the predicate and, consequently, that the predicate is predicated of it? Here is a 
point concerning which there has been a rather unjustified desire to draw distinctions 
between the assumptions of modern logic and those of Aristotelian logic. 
51 Op. and loc. cit.
52 Łukasiewicz has here in mind those cases of accidental predication (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) 
to which we have made abundant reference in the text.
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of the same kind which truth is not purely accidental, such as “Socrates is Socrates” or 
“Sophroniscus was Socrates’ father”.
Again, not only this excerpt depends on the misconception just detected – for 
the notion of predication lies, as we saw, upon an ontological distinction that 
Łukasiewicz misses –, it also is underpinned by four examples none of which is 
an instance of predication, due to the exact reasons that our preceding analysis 
has made clear.
This is evident in the case of the first two examples, taken from the Prior Ana-
lytics chapter under debate, for they correspond precisely to the examples given 
for accidental predication.
In “that white object is Socrates”, as well as in “that who approaches is Callias”, 
“Socrates” and “Callias” are not predicates of “that white object” and “that who 
approaches”, respectively; rather, they are their corresponding names. The sen-
tence is, consequently, an identity formula – not a predication.53
As to the third example, “Socrates is Socrates”, it is difficult to see how the 
second “Socrates” could be a predicate of the first. Why is the second Socrates 
said of the first and not the other way around? Could the author be suggesting 
that it is the order of the sentence that determines the predicate of the attribu-
tion? But then, if one says “Socrates was a great philosopher”, “Socrates” is the 
subject, yet if one says “A great philosopher was Socrates”, “Socrates” becomes 
the predicate? It is not, evidently, the order of the sentence that determines 
the predicate of the attribution. And it is also clear that the first and the se-
cond “Socrates” in the sentence “Socrates is Socrates” are undistinguishable 
as subject and predicate, which means, in other words, that the sentence does 
not express a predication.
The fourth example is the most surprising. How does Łukasiewicz interpret 
the clause “Socrates’ father” in the sentence “Sophroniscus was Socrates’ father”? 
As a singular term? If it is a singular term, then it is either a name or a definite 
description: and, in both cases, not a predicate. Conversely, if it is a predicate (the 
predicate “x is Socrates’ father”), then it is not a singular term. In the first case, we 
have no predication; in the second, the predicate is not an “individual or singular 
term”, in Łukasiewicz’s terms. In both cases, the example does not demonstrate 
what Łukasiewicz intended it to demonstrate. 
53 Cf., along the same line, Smith (1995: 33): “But when we force ‘Socrates’ into pre-
dicate position, what we have no longer seems to be predication, but instead a kind 
of identification: ‘That man is Socrates’ amounts to ‘That man and Socrates are the 
same’.”
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The crucial point here is that Łukasiewicz’s whole reasoning seems to miss – 
fundamentally – the Aristotelian doctrine in question. 
What Aristotle implies in the notion of accidental predication is the ontological 
thesis according to which an individual cannot be a predicate of another. It is not 
a question of terms or linguistic predicates: it is a question of real things and its 
actual predicates, in Aristotle’s primary ontological sense.
Now, thus understood, the doctrine is clear as to all the examples given: the 
individual Socrates is not a predicate of that white blotch that I see over there; 
rather, white is a predicate of the individual Socrates. And it is only by virtue of 
a linguistic accident that we can incorrectly express this truth, saying “that white 
thing is Socrates”.
From a logical point of view, the ontological notion of accidental predication 
means, thus, the following: the “correct” subject of the sentence, that is, the term 
that refers to the subject of the attribution, shifts, by linguistic accident, into the 
predicate’s slot. And this entails, in the terms above mentioned, a more funda-
mental idea: the sentence “that white thing is Socrates” expresses the proposition 
“Socrates is white”. (Naturally, the same is valid in the sentence “that who approa-
ches is Callias” and other similar sentences.)
In the remaining examples, which are not instances of accidental predication, 
the ontological thesis according to which no individual can be a predicate is also 
not undermined. In fact, all these (and the same would hold for the previous ex-
amples, which can be likewise interpreted) are cases of identity, not predication, 
and thus none exhibits individuals qua predicates.
Alternatively, one would have to admit that, in sentences like “Sophroniscus 
was Socrates’ father”, the predicate (“Socrates’ father”) is not a singular term, but, 
rather surprisingly, a general term (in which case the sentence should seemingly 
be read as “Sophroniscus was a Socrates’ father”) and therefore the Aristotelian 
thesis is, once again, not affected.
7. Final Discussion and Conclusions
The Aristotelian notion of accidental predication appeals, first of all, to a question 
of purely ontological character – one which is crucial to acknowledge as such, in 
order to avoid mistaking it with the related logical question. 
The ontological issue is thus: there are certain entities that, due to their very 
nature, cannot be predicates of anything.
Łukasiewicz saw fit to correct Aristotle, recalling that only terms – not entities – 
can be predicates. But this only manifests the confusion as to the two levels. In 
Aristotle’s thought, a predicate is one thing and that which is predicated (viz., in 
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the predicative sentence) is a whole other thing. Predicate is an ontological notion, 
and it has to do with that which belongs to a given thing (thus called, in equally 
ontological manner, its subject). That which is predicated is a logical notion, strictly 
dependent from the ontological notion, and it has to do with what can be said 
of the subject (in a predicative sentence). In a predicative sentence, that which is 
predicated is, of course, a term. But this term can only be predicated of another 
because what it designates is a predicate of that which is designated by the other. 
Now, there are things that cannot be (ontological) predicates of anything – such 
is the case of individuals. Accordingly, if the name of one of those things (i.e., a 
singular term) comes to be a part of a predicative sentence, filling the predicate’s 
slot, there we have, literally, an accident. 
But do such cases really exist? Surely not in Aristotle’s examples (“The musician 
is white”, “that white thing is a log”): in his examples, what fills the predicate’s slot 
is never a singular term. 
However, for the sake of the argument, one could re-read the examples in 
Łukasiewicz’s vein (“this white object is Socrates”, “that who approaches is Calli-
as”), where what fills the predicate’s slot is, surely enough, a singular term. 
Before this situation, we are forced to reiterate: only accidentally can a name (a 
singular term) appear as a predicate in a predicative sentence, since the individual 
to which that name corresponds is not the actual predicate of the thing referred 
to by the term appearing as subject in the sentence, as it is patently shown in 
Aristotle’s examples – and in Łukasiewicz’s, for that matter – and well explainable 
in light of the Aristotelian doctrine.
Now, that accident by which the name of something that cannot be a (onto-
logical) predicate appears as (logical) predicate is, quite clearly, an accident of 
linguistic nature.
This is what Aristotle is saying when he states that the sentence “this white 
thing is a log” is an inversion of the true predication “the log is white”. And this 
is also the notion present in the neoplatonic distinction between “natural” and 
“counternatural” predication. 
It is in this case, and in this case only, that the second level – the logical plan – 
intervenes. One could argue that, from a logical standpoint, the distinction 
between natural and counternatural predication (an ontological distinction) is 
meaningless and, thus, that it is meaningless to say that the “real” subject of the 
proposition expressed by the sentence “this white thing is a log” is that which is 
represented, in the sentence, by the predicate. From a strictly logical point of view, 
“log” is said of “this white thing” and is, therefore, the sentence’s predicate. As 
to those ontological claims according to which, in the order of reality, it is white 
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which is the predicate of log, and not the other way around, logic may very well 
respect them, but it is under no obligation to take them into consideration.
However, if this were the case, in order to accommodate in extremis Aristotle’s 
thesis, it would be necessary to concede that, although the objects it designates 
could never be (ontological) predicates, singular terms themselves could, indeed, 
be (logical) predicates. 
As it happens, this is not so. 
First of all, an Aristotelian could always argue that logic does not deal with 
sentences; it deals with propositions, where a singular term is never a predicate 
(except, of course, in identity formulae). Proposition, the last stronghold of essen-
tialism, is also the last stronghold of metaphysics; and in the intensional dwelling 
of propositions, the metaphysical order of reality can always be preserved. 
Secondly, Aristotle would still have good reasons to maintain that, even from 
a logical standpoint, singular terms cannot be predicates. Why? Because, in every 
situation where accidental predication occurs, either the predicate is not an actual 
singular term, or the case is not even one of predication. 
In “this white thing is a log” (a typical example in Aristotle), “a log” most 
certainly is not a singular term – it is a general one. What the sentence means 
to express is that it happens to this white thing (singular) to belong to the class 
(universal) of logs. (To be perfectly fair to Aristotle, one should have put it vice-
versa, but, for our purposes, the warning will suffice.)
No doubt this sentence, and every sentence equivalent to it, can always be read 
placing a singular term in the predicate’s position. In such case, it would read 
something like “this white thing is this log” – graceless equivalent of “this white 
thing is Socrates” or “that there is Callias”. But then, “this log”, or “Socrates”, or 
“Callias”, is not attributed to “this white thing” as predicate, rather as another name 
for “this white thing”, in which case the sentence is not asserting predication, but 
indeed identity, between the two terms. 
In this case, Aristotle’s accidental predication would be assimilated into the 
second class of Łukasiewicz’s examples. In other words, Aristotle’s accidental pre-
dication would be systematically reinterpreted as an ill-formed (or “accidental”) 
identity formula.
It is, to be sure, a somewhat far-fetched hypothesis. 
Yet, it holds a certain appeal, for it would allow us to reunite anew the two 
fringes, “lower” and “upper”, of Aristotle’s predication.
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